Two factors make tuna prime targets for illegal fishing: their high value on international markets (particularly bluefin and bigeye), and the fact that they are caught in the open ocean, in areas remote from fisheries surveillance.

Globally, significant quantities of tuna are believed to be caught illegally although, as always with IUU fishing, the true scope and scale is difficult to ascertain. In the Indian Ocean, IUU fishing has been estimated to amount to 10% of all landings of tuna species, or nearly 100,000 tonnes annually. The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the body responsible for managing the fishery for this critically endangered species, estimates IUU fishing amounts to the equivalent of about 33% of reported catches.

In the Atlantic, IUU longliners flying flags of convenience (FOC) appeared in the early 1980s, and became significant thereafter. In 1998, IUU catches of bigeye tuna were estimated to amount to 25,000 tonnes, but this dropped to less than 3,000 tonnes in 2002, out of a total of 75,000 tonnes. This 90% decline is thought to have been due to a number of factors, including the impact of the measures taken by ICCAT to reduce pirate fishing and efforts made by Japan and Taiwan to control their fleets.

ICCAT have been at the forefront of the fight against IUU fishing and have utilised a variety of tools at their disposal to combat this unscrupulous activity:

1. Import bans

Since 1996, ICCAT has required its members to prohibit imports of tuna and swordfish from certain countries whose vessels were known to be fishing in contravention of ICCAT's conservation measures. In several cases this has proved very effective with the countries in question joining ICCAT and taking steps to remove IUU vessels from their registers. For example, Panama was sanctioned for imports of bluefin tuna in 1996 and joined ICCAT in 1998. Sanctions were lifted in 1999.

These non-discriminatory trade measures have been one of the most innovative and effective developments in fisheries management and it is imperative that they are not weakened or undermined. There are certain loopholes in the current system, though, that have allowed IUU fishing to continue.

For example, from looking at Japan's import data it is clear that after trade sanctions were imposed on Belize, Cambodia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Equatorial Guinea and Honduras in 2001/2002, imports from these countries decreased dramatically. But imports particularly from Indonesia, but also Bolivia and Sierra Leone shot up, indicating that pirate fishermen had responded to the trade measures by re-flagging their vessels to countries not covered by the import ban.

Furthermore, following the lifting of sanctions against Panama in 1999 it seems that boats have been returning to the Panamanian registry and IUU activities have started again. It is now being proposed that Panama should be re-identified as having vessels fishing in the ICCAT area in a way that undermines ICCAT's conservation rules. Worryingly, this case could lead to other FOC countries trying to take advantage of trade sanctions being lifted simply by joining ICCAT, whereby it will take several years before their products are embargoed again. In fact, the precedent with Panama has led to other FOC countries joining ICCAT, such as Honduras and Belize.

To avoid repetitions of this scenario, ICCAT should not lift trade restrictive measures until the State concerned can demonstrate that vessels flying its flag have definitely stopped undermining the effectiveness of ICCAT's conservation and management measures. The State should also be expected to refrain from authorizing vessels flying its flag to fish in the ICCAT area unless compliance with ICCAT rules can be ensured.

2. Vessel listing

ICCAT maintains a list of vessels that are believed to be engaged in fishing activities, which undermine and/or diminish ICCAT's conservation measures - the so-called "black list" (see http://www.iccat.es/IUU.htm). This serves the purpose of putting pressure on unscrupulous vessel operators as well as the State whose flag they fly. More importantly, it is the concrete basis needed for the identification of countries that fail to control their fishing vessels and for the imposition of the kind of trade sanctions outlined above.

Such a list is not easy or cheap to maintain and update: vessels can change their names, flags etc, with minimum expense and hassle making it very difficult to track them and the companies behind them. Despite this, it has resulted in some States taking action against companies and vessels, and generally attempting to demonstrate their willingness to improve the situation.

In 2001, ICCAT's black list contained 400 vessels; today, it lists only 10. While vessel scrapping and repatriation schemes of IUU vessels can explain to some extent this sharp decrease, EJF suspect that there must still be IUU vessels operating clandestinely whose catches are laundered through transshipment.

ICCAT needs to establish clear and transparent criteria for black-listing and de-listing vessels. While in some cases it may be acceptable for a vessel to be removed from the list (for instance if a vessel was placed there by an erroneous sighting), there are other circumstances under which removal should not be allowed.

For example, in 2000, several vessels were removed from the list at the request of certain contracting parties, as they were operating under charter arrangements, whereby they changed flags to operate on a rental basis. This is not sufficient circumstance for the rehabilitation of a pirate fishing vessel. Simply because a vessel comes under a short-term charter does not mean that it will stop undermining the effectiveness of ICCAT's conservation and management measures, particularly once the charter period comes to an end. It is quite possible that IUU vessel owners are taking advantage of temporarily flying another flag to obtain an undeserved respectability. In some cases such a change of flag could even be used to avoid trade restrictive measures placed by ICCAT on the original Flag State. In other words, the ships and their catches could be "laundered".

3. Controlling Transshipment at Sea

One of the main ways in which IUU fishing can remain undetected is by vessels transshipping their catch at sea. Large vessels remain at sea for months at a time, refuelling, re-supplying and rotating their crews. By transferring their catches onto transport ships (reefers) IUU fishing vessels never need enter ports with their illegally caught fish. Moreover, the illegally caught fish is laundered through mixing with legally caught fish onboard these transport vessels.

ICCAT recognises the importance of strict measures for the control and monitoring of transshipping at sea. It requires that the vessels of contracting parties only transfer fish catches to and from vessels flying the flag of other contracting parties. Transshipment or landing of fish from a vessel flying the flag of a non-contracting party is prohibited, unless it can be proved that the fish has been caught in compliance with ICCAT conservation measures.

Enforcement of these rules on the high seas has been problematic, however. Consequently, in 2005, ICCAT committed to the establishment of a "white list" of reefers. Once implemented, fishing vessels will be allowed to transship their catches at-sea only to reefers on this list. The alternative will be to tranship in port, but depending on the port control measures in place, could result in further laundering on IUU-caught tuna.

A satellite monitoring system is to be installed on the white listed reefers, allowing ICCAT to monitor the vessels' position and, from 2007, an ICCAT observer is to be placed on board all reefers that are allowed to receive fish. The whole system is to be monitored and reported upon at ICCAT, and the system reviewed in 2008.

This is a major step in preventing the laundering of illegally-caught tuna and one which should be replicated to control transshipping in other fisheries and regions.